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Taxing Cannabis on the Reservation
Mark J. Cowan*
American Indian tribes that enter the cannabis industry confront a multisovereign tax system that lacks certainty and horizontal equity. The complex
interaction of state legalization and taxation of cannabis, federal tax law, the
status of tribes as both governments and business enterprises, and the legal and
tax landscape in Indian country can give tribes tax advantages and disadvantages
compared to off-reservation cannabis dispensaries. This article analyzes these tax
issues, examines them in the context of prior challenges posed by Indian gaming,
and suggests reforms that address the tax inequities that can result from cannabis
sales on Indian reservations.

INTRODUCTION
Cannabis. Taxes. Indian tribes. The law surrounding each of these areas is complex, uncertain,
and at times mysterious. This article addresses the confluence of all three. Federally-recognized
American Indian 1 tribes, like states, are sub-federal, sovereign governments. Tribal concerns
must be considered in debates over cannabis 2 law.

* Professor of Accountancy and Director, Master of Science in Accountancy-Taxation Programs, College of
Business and Economics, Boise State University. My thanks to the sponsors, organizers, and participants in the 2020
symposium Legal, Ethical, and Compliance Issues in Emerging Markets: Cannabis in the States, presented by the
Spears School of Business Center for Legal Studies & Business Ethics at Oklahoma State University and the
American Business Law Journal. My thanks also to the editors of the American Business Law Journal and to
Jonathan Wheatley for his research assistance.
This article uses the terms “Indian,” “Native American,” and “tribal member” interchangeably. The term “Indian”
can be problematic in some contexts, but it is the term used by legal scholars, tribal members, and the law itself. See
Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1003 n.1
(1995) (indicating that the term “Indian” is generally used by reservation residents to identify the national group to
which they belong).
1

This article will use the term “cannabis” and “marijuana” interchangeably to refer to the psychoactive drug that is
illegal under federal law but has been legalized for medical or recreational use by certain states. The term marijuana,
or variants thereof, are often used in the law. But individuals in the industry tend to use the term cannabis. Andrea
Romi, et al., From the Black-Market to the Gray-Market: Accounting's Role in the Budding Cannabis Industry 7,
n.9 (Working Paper, December 19, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090386 [hereinafter Gray-Market].

2

Cannabis can be consumed in various forms, like cigarettes, tablets, oils, or edibles. See JAMES T.
O’REILLY, LEGAL GUIDE TO THE BUSINESS OF MARIJUANA § 6:3 (2019). For purposes of this article, the method of
delivery is not relevant. Also, this article does not address non-psychoactive cannabis-related products, like
cannabidiol (CBD) or hemp—which sometimes have different legal treatment. See id. at §§ 10:11-10:12.

1
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Indian tribes that enter the cannabis industry, and private cannabis businesses that operate
in Indian country, 3 confront a multi-sovereign tax system that lacks certainty and horizontal
equity. 4 The complex interaction of state legalization and taxation of cannabis, federal tax law,
the status of tribes as both governments and business enterprises, and the legal and tax landscape
in Indian country can give tribal cannabis stores advantages and disadvantages compared to offreservation cannabis dispensaries. This article analyzes the tax issues that arise in the cannabis
industry in Indian country, puts them in the context of prior challenges posed by Indian gaming,
and suggests reforms that address the tax inequities that can result from cannabis sales on Indian
reservations. These perspectives have not been analyzed in the extant academic literature. 5
If the legalized cannabis industry is to grow, 6 it must be subject to a fair tax system. The
best strategy for governments involved—federal, state, and tribal—is to put aside their
differences and individual quests for easy revenue in favor of a fair and clear approach to taxing
the industry.
This article is organized as follows. Part I reviews the current legal status of cannabis in
the United States. Part II explains how the cannabis industry is currently taxed. Part III explains
the unique tax landscape in Indian country. Part IV mines the history of the well-established
Indian gaming industry for guidance in resolving tax issues in the emerging Indian cannabis
industry. Part V identifies the key tax policy issues at stake and provides suggestions for the
federal, state, and tribal governments in addressing the tax issues raised in this article.

I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF CANNABIS LAWS

Since the enactment of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), cannabis has been listed as
a “Schedule 1” controlled substance. 7 It is illegal “to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 8 Schedule I

This article uses terms such as “Indian country,” “Indian lands,” “Indian territory,” and “reservations”
interchangeably to refer to the territory that is under the jurisdiction of a particular Indian tribe. This article also
assumes that the boundaries of a tribe’s territory are clear. In reality, there could be a threshold issue as to whether a
transaction is actually taking place within “Indian country.” See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 3.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
3

The tax policy concept of horizontal equity, which holds that taxpayers in the same position (normally measured
by their income) should pay the same tax, is explored in more detail at infra Part V.A.1.

4

Pieces of the puzzle, however, have been explored. For commentary on Indian tribes and cannabis in general, see
infra note 29; on federal tax issues associated with the cannabis industry, see infra note 61; and for analysis of state
tax issues related to cannabis, see infra note 92.

5

This article takes no position on whether cannabis legalization is good public policy. Instead, this article focusses
on taxing the cannabis industry in fair manner in jurisdictions where the voters and their elected representatives
have decided legalization is in their best interests.

6

21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2018). In the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-334 (Dec. 20, 2018),
Congress amended the definition of marijuana to exclude hemp. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i) (2018). “Hemp” is
defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1639o(1) (2018).

7

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2018). There are severe punishments, including imprisonment and fines, for violating the
CSA. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018).

8
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3

controlled substances are ones the federal government has determined have high potential for
abuse and no accepted medical use. 9
A.

State Liberalization of Cannabis Laws

States began to deviate from the federal ban in 1996, when California became the first state to
allow the medical use of cannabis. 10 In general, California decriminalized the possession and
cultivation of cannabis by patients and caregivers when recommended by a physician. 11 Since
1996, thirty-two additional states have passed similar laws 12—although there is a great diversity
in what use is allowed. 13
Starting with Colorado in 2012, states began to relax restrictions on the recreational use
of cannabis by adults. As of this writing, recreational cannabis is legal in eleven states: 14
Alaska, 15 California, 16 Colorado, 17 Illinois, 18 Maine, 19 Massachusetts, 20 Michigan, 21 Nevada, 22
Oregon, 23 Vermont, 24 and Washington. 25 These states generally allow an individual over 21
years of age to possess, cultivate, or use limited amounts of cannabis. States vary in the amount
of cannabis allowed, where cannabis can be consumed, where and how much can be grown,
whether and how retail sales are allowed, and regulation of the cannabis supply chain. 26 States
usually require “seed to sale” tracking to prevent illegally-grown cannabis from “leaking” into
9

21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2018).

State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medicalmarijuana-laws.aspx#3 (Mar. 10, 2020) [hereinafter NCSL].

10

11

Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 177 (2018).

NCSL, supra note 10. Several states have more narrow exemptions for the use of “low TCH, High cannabidiol
(CBD)” products. Id.
12

13

O’REILLY, supra note 2, at § 2:1.

Heather Gillers, Cities Look to Marijuana Taxes for Help, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2020, at A2. The District of
Columbia and U.S. territories Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands have also legalized recreational marijuana.
NCSL, supra note 10.

14

15

ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.38.010 to 900 (2015).

16

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.1-11362.5 (2017); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 26000-26231.2 (2017).

17

COLO. CONST. ART. XVIII, § 16 (2018).

18

410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-5 (2019).

19

ME. STAT. tit. 28-B, §§ 101-1102; 1501-1504 (2018).

20

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, §§ 1-21 (2017).

21

MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.27951-27967 (2018).

22

NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453D.020 (2020).

23

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.005-968 (2017).

24

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4230a-e (2018).

25

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 15.125.010-.060 (2019).

26
A detailed review of state-by-state cannabis laws is not necessary for purposes of this article. See generally
O’REILLY, supra note 2, at App. A (providing a state-by-state summary of recreational and medical cannabis laws).
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the legal supply chain. 27 To avoid attracting federal scrutiny, states will typically require that the
entire “seed to sale” process occur entirely within the state. 28 That is, cannabis cannot be sold in
the state if it was grown outside of the state.
B.

Tribal Liberalization of Cannabis Laws

Following the lead of the states, Indian tribes have also ventured into the cannabis sector. 29
Tribes are generally more cautious, however, as they may be concerned about putting critical
federal financial support in jeopardy by violating federal law. 30 Tribal governments, unlike the
state governments, are likely to own and operate the cannabis businesses themselves. 31 In 2015,
two tribes in Washington opened the first tribally-owned retail cannabis stores in the United
States. 32 The Squaxin Island Tribe opened Elevation, 33 followed a month later by the Suquamish
Tribe’s Agate Dreams. 34 In 2016, the Puyallup Tribe (also in Washington) announced plans to
grow cannabis for medical use at its Salish Cancer Center. 35 The Puyallup tribe also operates
Medicine Creek Analytics, which tests retail cannabis for pesticides and other harmful
substances. 36
In 2017, the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe opened NuWu Cannabis Marketplace, 37 a large
recreational cannabis store. Its building is nearly 16,000 square feet and it features 170 feet of
display counters and a 24-hour drive-thru. 38 Also in 2017, the Ely Shoshone Tribe in Nevada

27

Id. at § 13.4.

28

Id. at § 13.1.

There has been little academic analysis of the legal issues raised by cannabis in Indian country. But see, e.g., Kyle
Montour, Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire: The State-Tribal Quandary of Tribal Marijuana, 4 AM. INDIAN L.J.
222 (2016) (exploring the state-tribal legal conflicts that could arise over cannabis in Indian country); Melinda
Smith, Note, Native Americans and the Legalization of Marijuana: Can the Tribes Turn Another Addiction into
Affluence?, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 507 (2014-2015) (discussing how Indian tribes should be incorporated into a
legal system in which the federal government legalizes cannabis).

29

James Ellis, Legal Weed Could be a Godsend for American Indian Tribes, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 23, 2018)
https://www.newsweek.com/legal-cannabis-could-be-godsend-american-indian-tribes-895240.
30

For a rare exception, see Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Benefits of Government-Owned Marijuana Stores, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 659, 659 (2016) [hereinafter Leff, Government-Owned] (reporting on a cannabis store in North
Bonneville, Washington, which is owned by an entity created by the city government).
31

Richard Walker, Many Tribes Say Billion-Dollar Cannabis Business is a Gateway to Economic Development,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 25, 2019), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/many-tribes-say-billion-dollarcannabis-business-is-a-gateway-to-economic-development-2mDYegq8v02VmO-7SzjyQg.
32

33

ELEVATION, https://high-elevation.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).

34

AGATE DREAMS, https://www.agatedreams.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).

35

Walker, supra note 32.

Id. Not all Washington tribes are jumping on the cannabis bandwagon, however. In 2013, the Yakima Nation
banned the growing, use, and sale of cannabis on its reservation and on off-reservation lands that it considers its
historical territory. Id.
36

37

NUWU CANNABIS MARKETPLACE, https://nuwu.vegas/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).

38

Walker, supra note 32.
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opened the Tsaa Nesunkwa Dispensary in a more rural part of the state. 39 Outside of Washington
and Nevada, where recreational cannabis is legal and the tribes operate dispensaries in
accordance with tribal-state agreements, 40 tribal expansion into the cannabis industry has been
more fraught. In 2015, for example, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe became the first tribe to
legalize recreational cannabis. 41 The tribe built a grow facility and was constructing a smoking
lounge on its reservation in South Dakota (a state where cannabis is illegal), 42 but it burned its
crop over concerns that state authorities would prosecute visitors once they left the reservation
and that federal authorities might raid the tribe’s cannabis facilities. 43 As more states relax
cannabis laws, more tribes will no doubt be interested in entering the cannabis industry. 44
C.

Federal Reaction to State and Tribal Legalization

As noted above, cannabis remains illegal under federal law. 45 Starting in 2009, however, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), in series of memos to U.S. Attorneys, relaxed enforcement
policies. The DOJ first advised that, while drug trafficking remained an important enforcement
priority, federal prosecutorial resources should not focus “on individuals whose actions are in
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana.” 46
In 2013, what has become known as the “Cole Memorandum” addressed enforcement of
the CSA in an era of state decriminalization of recreational cannabis. 47 The Cole Memorandum
noted that although Congress views cannabis as a dangerous substance, federal prosecution of
small-scale cannabis sales should not be a priority where state law allows such sales via a tightly-

39

Id.; TSAA NESUNKWA DISPENSARY, https://tsaanesunkwa.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).

40

See infra Part V.C.2.

Sarah S, Manning, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe Burns Crop, Suspends Marijuana Operation, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Nov. 8, 2015), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/flandreau-santee-sioux-tribe-burns-crop-suspendsmarijuana-operation-C7jhlo3kiEqIhIUAZNQb5A.
41

42

Id.

43

Id.

Some tribes have decided to grow industrial hemp. Walker, supra note 32. As previously noted, hemp is no longer
a Schedule I controlled substance. See supra note 7.
44

The CSA is a valid exercise of Congress’ power over interstate commerce, even in “seed to sale” states (where
cannabis is fully an intrastate activity) because the in-state use of cannabis could, in the aggregate, have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).

45

Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected United States Attorneys, Investigations &
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Med. Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-attorneys-investigations-andprosecutions-states.
46

Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All United States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[hereinafter Cole Memorandum].
47
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regulated market. 48 In 2014, the DOJ announced (in what has become known as the “Wilkinson
Memorandum”) that the guidance in the Cole Memorandum would apply in Indian country. 49
DOJ policy became less clear in 2018, when Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the
Cole and Wilkinson Memoranda. 50 Sessions essentially de-centralized the federal approach to
cannabis—advising U.S. Attorneys to use “well-established” general principles for deciding
when to prosecute. 51 Some U.S. Attorneys, overseeing districts where cannabis is legal, signaled
that the status quo would continue. 52
Beyond the DOJ’s statements, funding restrictions can stifle enforcement of the CSA.
Under the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment, 53 the DOJ cannot spend funds to prevent states
from “implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession or
cultivation of medical marijuana.” 54 The Amendment does not apply to recreational cannabis.

II.

TAXATION OF THE CANNABIS INDUSTRY

As background for the tribal issues discussed later, this Part summarizes the general tax rules that
apply to sales of cannabis. Section A reviews the federal income issues, including a provision
(Section 280E) that disallows many business expenses of cannabis businesses. Section A also
briefly reviews choice of entity issues in the cannabis industry. Section B then explains how the
states, in general, tax the sale of cannabis.

48

Id.

Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir. of the Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, to All United States Attorneys, All
First Assistant United States Attorneys, All Criminal Chiefs, All Appellate Chiefs, All OCDETF Coordinators, &
All Tribal Liaisons, Policy Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014),
https://dfi.wa.gov/sites/default/files/monty-wilkinson-memo.pdf.
49

Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., to All United States Attorneys, Marijuana Enforcement
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download.
50

51

Id.

52
E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of Or., U.S. Attorney Statement on Marijuana
Enforcement in the District of Oregon (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/us-attorney-statementmarijuana-enforcement-district-oregon (pledging to “continue working with our federal, state, local and tribal law
enforcement partners to pursue shared public safety objectives, with an emphasis on stemming the overproduction of
marijuana and the diversion of marijuana out of state, dismantling criminal organizations and thwarting violent
crime in our communities”).
53

O’REILLY, supra note 2, at § 2:3.2.

54
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130
(2014).
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A.

Federal Taxes

1.

In General

7

Except as noted below, cannabis businesses are subject to federal income tax just like any other
business. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that income earned from illegal activities, such
as the illegal sale of liquor during Prohibition, is taxable. 55
Although many business expenses are deductible against income, taxpayers generally
have no right to any specific deduction. “Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed
depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision thereof can any particular
deduction be allowed.” 56 Congress provided a lot of grace in Section 162(a), which allows a
deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business.” 57 This is a broad category of deductions, which applies to
businesses of all types (legal or illegal) provided no special rule applies and all the requirements
(such as proper documentation and maintenance of books and records) are met.
2.

Section 280E

One key difference between cannabis businesses and other (legal) businesses is that cannabis
businesses cannot deduct many of their expenses; a result of Internal Revenue Code Section
280E:
Expenditures in connection with the illegal sale of drugs. No deduction or
credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which
comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances
(within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which
is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or
business is conducted. 58
Congress enacted Section 280E, “more a political statement than a model of tax policy,” 59 in
1982 in response to Edmondson v. Commissioner. 60 In Edmondson, the U.S. Tax Court allowed a
dealer in amphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine to deduct his estimated cost of goods sold, a
portion of the rent on his residence, as well as “the purchase of a small scale, packaging

United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). See also James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961)
(noting that, since the early days of the income tax, it has been “a well-established principle . . . that unlawful, as
well as lawful, gains are comprehended within the term ‘gross income.’”).
55

56

New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).

57

I.R.C. § 162(a) (2018).

58

I.R.C. § 280E (2018).

Pat Oglesby, How Bob Dole Got America Addicted to Marijuana Taxes, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/12/18/how-bob-dole-got-america-addicted-to-marijuana-taxes/
[hereinafter Oglesby, Bob Dole].
59

60

T.C. Memo 1981-623.
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expenses, telephone expenses, and automobile expenses” as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. 61 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation explained Section 280E’s rationale:
There is a sharply defined public policy against drug dealing. To allow drug
dealers the benefit of business expense deductions at the same time that the U.S.
and its citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not
compelled by the fact that such deductions are allowed to other, legal
enterprises. 62
Although not explicitly stated in the text of Section 280E, the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation noted that “[t]o preclude possible challenges on constitutional grounds,”
the deduction for cost of goods sold was not included in the scope of Section 280E. 63 The
constitutional issues concern the definition of income. Income is generally defined not as “gross
receipts” but as gross receipts less the cost of goods sold. 64 Taxpayers engaged in the illicit drug
trade are thus still allowed to deduct cost of goods sold. 65
61
For critical commentary on Section 280E, see Patrick J. Cleary, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Why IRC §
280E Is Not the Industry Killer It Is Portrayed to Be (Moritz College of Law, Drug Enf’t and Policy Ctr., Working
Paper No. 11, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440110 (noting that the cannabis industry continues to grow despite
Section 280E and arguing that Section 280E actually helps the industry by slowing its growth and curbing
oversaturation); Philip T. Hackney, A Response to Professor Leff’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for Marijuana
Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 25 (2014) (taking issue with Leff’s suggestion, infra, that cannabis dealers should
be able to operate as tax-exempt entities); Kimberly A. Houser et al., How Current Tax Policy Affects the Marijuana
Industry, 79 ST. TAX NOTES 583 (Feb. 22, 2016) (suggesting reforms to Section 280E); Douglas A. Kahn & Howard
Bromberg, Provisions Denying a Deduction for Illegal Expenses and Expenses of an Illegal Business Should Be
Repealed, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 207 (2016) (arguing for repeal of Section 280E and other disallowance provisions
because they impose arbitrary penalties); Leff, supra note 31 (arguing that governments which legalize marijuana
could chose to own the dispensaries, and thus be exempt from tax and the constraints of Section 280E); Benjamin
Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523 (2014) (arguing that cannabis businesses
should be allowed to operate as nonprofit, Section 501(c)(4) organizations and thus avoid Section 280E) [hereinafter
Leff, Tax Planning]; Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical Marijuana Businesses, 66 TAX
LAW. 429 (2013) (analyzing Section 280E and the inventory accounting rules in the context of recent cases). See
also Douglas A. Kahn & Howard Bromberg, Prompt on the Tax Treatment of a Marijuana Business, 8 COLUM. J.
TAX L. TAX MATTERS 2 (Aug. 7, 2019); Zachary Pullin, Dude, Where’s My Deduction 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX
MATTERS 2 (Aug. 7, 2019) (various comments on Section 280E and related issues); Kenneth H. Silverberg,
“Reverse Al Capone-ism” and the Tax Treatment of Marijuana Businesses, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 2
(Aug. 7, 2019) (the three previous citations are a part of one collective work that can be found at
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/announcement/view/139#kahnbrom; Oglesby, Bob Dole,
supra note 59 (discussing how Section 280E, by disallowing deductions—including deductions for advertising, is a
tool to reduce advertising of marijuana).

STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY
AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 (H.R. 4961, 97th Congress; P.L. 97-248), at 264 (1982).

62

63

Id. at 264.

64

Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1918).

While the tax law’s Section 263A uniform capitalization rules (UNICAP) require businesses to capitalize many
expenses in inventory (and thus cost of goods sold), cannabis businesses may be limited in their ability to ability to
aggressively classify more expenses as deductible cost of goods. Taxpayers cannot capitalize nondeductible costs in
inventory: “Any cost which (but for this subsection) could not be taken into account in computing taxable income
for any taxable year shall not be treated as a cost described in this paragraph.” I.R.C. § 263A(a)(2) (2018) (flush
language).
65
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Section 280E in Court

As dispensaries migrate from the illegal, black market world of drug dealers to the quasi-legal,
“gray market” world of state-regulated dispensaries, 66 they are complying with state regulations,
keeping accurate accounting records, and openly reporting their activities to the tax authorities.
The increased salience of the cannabis industry has attracted the attention of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), which has been enforcing Section 280E. 67 Dispensaries have pushed
back, with little success.
The courts, for example, have ruled that Section 280E is not a “dead letter” just because
states have legalized certain uses of cannabis and the federal government is not rigorously
enforcing its ban on the sale of cannabis. 68 Indeed, the courts have repeatedly held that selling
cannabis in states where it is legal is still “trafficking” as stated in Section 280E 69 and that
Section 280E disallows all of a dispensary’s deductions (except cost of goods sold), not just
ordinary and necessary business expenses under Section 162. 70 Furthermore, the courts have
ruled that the IRS has the authority to apply Section 280E without first conducting a criminal
investigation of the taxpayer. 71 The courts have also not been kind to constitutional challenges,
holding that Section 280E is not a penalty for purposes of the Eight Amendment’s ban on
excessive fines 72 and is within Congress’s power to tax income under the Sixteenth
Amendment. 73 Also, the courts have held that placing the burden of proof on taxpayers to show
that the IRS erred in applying Section 280E does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination. 74
66

See Gray-Market, supra note 2, at 1.

Section 280E is estimated to increase federal coffers by about $1.3 billion per year starting in 2020. Pat Oglesby,
Marijuana Taxes—Present and Future Traps, 83 ST. TAX NOTES 391, 391, (Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Oglesby,
Traps].
67

See, e.g., High Desert Relief, Inc. v. United States, 917 F.3d 1170, 1197 (10th Cir. 2019); Alpenglow Botanicals,
LLC. v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1206 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S.Ct. 2745 (2019).

68

E.g., N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. No. 4, at *15 (2019); Patients Mut. Assistance
Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 190 (2018); Canna Care, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2015-206, at *9,
aff’d 694 Fed. Appx. 570 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19, 38 (2012) aff’d 792 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2015); Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 173, 182-83
(2007).

69

N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. No. 4 (2019), at *13-15 (ruling that a medical marijuana
dispensary was not entitled to deductions under Section 164 (taxes) and Section 167 (deprecation)).
70

High Desert Relief, Inc. v. United States, 917 F.3d 1170, 1185 (10th Cir. 2019). See also Alpenglow Botanicals,
LLC v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S.Ct. 2745 (2019) (indicating that a
criminal investigation or conviction is not a prerequisite to applying Section 280E); The Green Sol. Retail, Inc. v.
United States, 855 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S.Ct. 1281 (2018) (same).

71

Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC. v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S.Ct. 2745
(2019); N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. No. 4 (2019), at *9. Since deductions are a matter
of legislative grace, “Congress is free to grant, restrict, and deny deductions as it sees fit,” and thus a denial of a
deduction, like Section 280E, cannot be construed as a penalty. Id.at *3.
72

Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC. v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S.Ct. 2745
(2019).
73

74

Feinberg v. Comm’r, 916 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied 140 S.Ct. 49 (2019).
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The courts have also dismissed challenges to the application of Section 280E based on its
use of the phrase “consists of trafficking.” 75 “Consists of,” taxpayers have argued based on
dictionary definitions, implies exclusivity. 76 But the U.S. Tax Court ruled that Section 280E
applies even if the business does things (like selling books or clothing) besides traffic in a
controlled substance. 77
Some dispensaries have tried to divide their activities into cannabis and non-cannabis
components, which would allow them to deduct expenses related to the latter. In Californians
Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v. Commissioner (CHAMP), 78 the U.S. Tax Court
found that a medical marijuana dispensary operated two lines of business: marijuana sales and
caregiving services. CHAMP’s regular and extensive non-cannabis caregiving business (like
discussion groups, counseling, social events, field trips, and social services) “stood on its own,
separate and apart from [CHAMP’s] provision of medical marijuana.” 79 The court allowed
CHAMP to allocate its expenses between the two businesses based on the number of employees
and space assigned to each and deduct the expenses of the non-cannabis operations. 80
CHAMP is an outlier. The U.S. Tax Court has refused to allow bifurcation in several subsequent
cases, holding that any non-cannabis operations were too connected to the cannabis sales. 81
Litigation will no doubt continue, but the message from the courts is that Section 280E is valid.
It is difficult for dispensaries to carve out their non-cannabis businesses to partially avoid Section
280E, and even those that are able to do so must bear the administrative burden of keeping
separate records and perhaps operating the businesses in suboptimal ways.
4.

Entity Choice

A cannabis business’s choice of entity impacts how it is taxed. Corporations (“C” corporations)
are subject to tax at a flat 21% rate at the entity level. 82 Distributions of earnings to shareholders
are generally taxed a second time, as dividends, 83 when received by the shareholders. 84

The most extensive analysis of this issue was by the U.S. Tax Court in Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp.
v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 190-97 (2018).
75

76

Id.

77
Id. at 196-97. The court noted that accepting the taxpayer’s argument would be absurd: “any street-level drug
dealer could circumvent [Section 280E] by selling a single item that wasn’t a controlled substance—like a pack of
gum, or even drug paraphernalia such as a hypodermic needle or a glass pipe.” Id. at 192.
78

128 T.C. 173 (2007).

79

Id. at 183.

80

Id. at 185.

Alt. Health Care Advocates v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 225 (2018); Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corporation v.
Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176 (2018); Canna Care, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2015-206, aff’d 694 Fed. Appx. 570 (9th
Cir. 2017) (unpublished); Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19 (2012) aff’d 792 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2015).
81

82

I.R.C. § 11(b) (2018).

To the extent the corporation had earnings and profits, the distribution is taxed as a dividend. See I.R.C.
§§ 301(c)(1), 316 (2018).
83

84
Shareholders who are individuals may qualify to pay tax on dividends at the capital gains tax rates (0%, 15%, or
20%, depending on income). I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2018).
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Individuals are subject to progressive tax rates currently ranging from 10% to 37%. 85 Conduit
entities, like partnerships (a category which normally includes Limited Liability Companies) and
S Corporations, do not generally pay tax at the entity level. Instead, they allocate their income
among their owners—who then report the income on their own tax returns. 86
Nonprofits are also present in the cannabis industry. Under state law, many entities in the
medical cannabis market must be set up as nonprofit corporations—meaning any earnings must
go to benefit patients or the community and not the owners or founders. 87 Despite their nonprofit
missions, such entities are still taxed as corporations by the federal government. The entities
cannot qualify for federal tax-exempt status because they are involved in illegal activity. 88
Sub-federal (tribal and state) governments, which are generally exempt from federal
income tax, 89 may also enter the cannabis industry. Indian tribes have entered the market, but
state and local governments, with isolated exceptions, have not. 90
If cannabis is legalized at the federal level, there may be a shift in preferences for entities.
For example, it might become possible for nonprofit medical dispensaries to obtain tax-exempt
status. With the cloud of illegality removed, more sub-federal governments may decide to enter
the industry directly—as is the case with alcohol in some states.
B.

State Taxes

One of the reasons states are legalizing recreational 91 cannabis is to tax it. 92 Total annual state
tax revenues from recreational cannabis have grown from approximately $24 million in 2014 to
$987 million in 2018.93 From 2014 to 2018, states took in over $2.9 billion in cumulative
85

I.R.C. § 1 (2018).

86

I.R.C. § 701 (2018) (partnerships); I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366 (2018) (S corporations).

This is the case in California, for example. Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176,
182 (2018).

87

See, e.g. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (holding that an anti-war organization could not qualify under
Section 501(c)(3) because it was engaged in illegal activities of blocking traffic and disrupting the transportation of
supplies). But see Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 61 (arguing that cannabis dispensaries should be allowed taxexempt status as “social welfare organizations” under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2018)).
88

89

See infra Part III.B.1.

See Leff, Government-Owned, supra note 31 (reporting on a cannabis store in North Bonneville, Washington,
which is owned by an entity created by the city government).
90

Although some states that only allow medical cannabis impose a tax on it, it is generally only an extension of its
sales tax and it tends to raise little revenue. See Sarah Trumble & Nathan Kasai, How States Tax Medical
Marijuana, THIRD WAY, (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/one-pager/how-states-tax-medical-marijuana.

91

See O’REILLY, supra note 2, at §8.1. Excellent analysis of state tax design has been done by tax attorney Pat
Oglesby. E.g., Pat Oglesby, Marijuana Revenue Competition—Look Out Below, 88 ST. TAX NOTES 541 (May 7,
2018) [hereinafter Oglesby, Look Out]; Oglesby, Traps, supra note 67. Research institutions have also provided
excellent analysis of the state taxation of cannabis. E.g., Lucy Dadayan, Are States Betting on Sin? The Murky
Future of State Taxation, URBAN INSTITUTE (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/are-statesbetting-sin-murky-future-state-taxation/view/full_report; The Pew Charitable Trusts, Forecasts Hazy for State
Marijuana Revenue, PEW (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2019/08/forecasts-hazy-for-state-marijuana-revenue; Carl Davis et al., Taxing Cannabis, INSTITUTE ON
TAXATION & ECONOMIC POLICY (Jan. 23, 2019), https://itep.org/taxing-cannabis/ [hereinafter Taxing Cannabis].
92

93

Dadayan, supra note 92, at 48.
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revenues from recreational cannabis. 94 While the potential revenue is enticing, it can be
volatile—especially as incomes change, tastes evolve, and more states legalize recreational
cannabis. 95 Some have even predicted that cannabis tax revenue could disappear if the federal
government legalizes and taxes cannabis or if a sufficient number of states legalize and start a
low-tax race to the bottom as they compete for cannabis businesses. 96
Most states tax cannabis using an excise tax based on the sales price. 97 This can be done
at the sale from the cultivator/wholesaler to the retailer, the sale from the retailer to the
consumer, or both. 98 The cultivator/wholesaler tax is similar to alcohol taxes, and the cost tends
to get passed along/hidden in the price of the product to the consumer. 99 Retail excise taxes,
currently ranging from 10% in Nevada to 37% in Washington, are akin to retail sales taxes. 100
Some states apply both their normal retail sales tax and a retail excise tax to cannabis sales. 101 In
addition, states often allow local jurisdictions to impose their general sales taxes or a cannabisspecific retail excise tax on cannabis sales. 102
Other states tax cannabis based on its weight. Alaska, for example, taxes mature flowers
at $50 per ounce. 103 Alaska currently only taxes by weight and not sales price. 104 California taxes
based on sales price and weight. 105
Despite all the state excise taxes being thrown at the industry, some states are giving legal
cannabis businesses relief on their state income tax returns. Most states begin their income tax
calculations with a business’s federal taxable income and then make adjustments to get to the
business’s state taxable income. States like Colorado and Oregon are allowing businesses, in
calculating their state taxable income, to deduct any businesses expenses that were disallowed by
Section 280E at the federal level. 106
Overall, state taxes on cannabis must be calibrated so that they raise revenue without
being so high that they push buyers into the black market. 107 As the industry matures, states will
94

Id. at 49.

95

Gillers, supra note 14.

96

Oglesby, Traps, supra note 67, at 398-99.

97

Dadayan, supra note 92, at 45-46.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 46.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106
See COL. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104(4)(r)-(s) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 316.680(1)(i) (2019). States that allow
deductions that were disallowed at the federal level by Section 280E are providing cold comfort. State income tax
rates are a fraction of federal income tax rates and, thus, the pain of Section 280E is much more significant at the
federal level than at the state level.
107
Gillers, supra note 14. It is estimated that the black market is about $40 billion nationwide and that legal
marijuana flowers cost 77% more than illegal ones in California. Id.
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no doubt experiment with changes to their tax regimes. State taxation of cannabis will continue
to be a subject of debate and recalibration.

III.

THE TAX LANDSCAPE IN INDIAN COUNTRY

To understand the tax issues posed by cannabis legalization on Indian reservations, this Part
provides an overview of the tax landscape in Indian county. Section A reviews the legal status of
Indian tribes. Section B then explains how the federal tax law applies to Indian tribes and tribal
members. Finally, Section C discusses sub-federal (tribal and state) taxation in Indian country. 108
A.

Legal Status of American Indian Tribes

The Native American community is not a monolith. There are 573 federally recognized tribes in
the United States, each with its own culture, traditions, history, government, and economic
status. 109 Indian tribes occupy a unique position in American law. Along with the federal
government and the state governments, Indian tribes are considered sovereign entities. 110 Tribes,
while governmental entities, are not considered “states” or “foreign nations” for most purposes
of the law. 111
Under the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government has
exclusive power over Indian tribes. 112 States may only exercise authority on tribal lands within
their borders if federal law so provides. Consider the implications of this structure. Each Indian
reservation is generally located within the borders of a particular state (or states). 113 In that sense,
tribes are like local governments—such as cities, towns, or counties. But local governments do
not have sovereignty. They only have the power (including taxing power) that has been

108
For more detail, see Mark J. Cowan, Tax Issues in Indian Country: A Guide for Practitioners, 106 J. TAX’N 296
(2007) (providing a basic introduction to tax issues in Indian country); Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian
Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal
Governmental Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93 (2005) (analyzing the background of state/tribal tax conflicts and
proposing a federal solution); Mark J. Cowan, Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination of Federal Income
Tax Policy Towards Indian Tribes, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 345 (2004) [hereinafter Cowan, Leaving Money] (reviewing the
federal tax treatment of the commercial income of tribes and comparing such treatment to the federal taxation of
commercial income earned by state governments).

See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN AFF., https://www.bia.gov/frequentlyasked-questions (last visited Apr. 7, 2020); About Tribes, NAT’L CONG. OF AMERICAN INDIANS,
http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). This article only addresses tribes that are officially
recognized by the federal government.
109

Upon arriving in America, the European powers implicitly acknowledged tribal sovereignty by dealing with the
tribes as they would other foreign governments and leaving the tribes to govern their own internal affairs. WILLIAM
C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 76 (5th ed. 2009); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at § 4.01.
110

111

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831).

112
Under the Indian Commerce Clause, one of Congress’s enumerated powers is to “regulate Commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as vesting
exclusive power over the Indian tribes in the federal government. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19.

The Navajo Nation, for example, spans parts of Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. History, NAVAJO NATION
GOV’T, https://www.navajo-nsn.gov/history.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
113
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delegated to them by the true sovereign—the state in which they are located. 114 The state has
ultimate responsibility for local affairs, even though in practice it may allow a lot of autonomy
and power to reside at the local level. Any state versus local dispute can ultimately be resolved
using state power. Unlike local governments, tribes have inherent sovereignty over local affairs
and do not owe their power to the state in which they are located. 115 Thus, tribes and states are
bound together geographically but not politically. States and tribes must work together on local
issues, but neither has significant authority over the other. 116 State-tribal disputes over local
matters—like taxes or cannabis—can only be resolved by state-tribal agreement or by the
intervention of the one government with the ultimate power over Indian affairs–the federal
government. 117
The goals of federal policy towards Indian tribes have varied over the years, but current
federal Indian policy emphasizes tribal self-government and self-determination. 118 If Indian
tribes are to be truly self-sufficient, they must develop sophisticated governments with steady
revenue streams that can fund needed services. Realistically, this can only occur with economic
development in Indian country. 119 Some tribes eschew commercial ventures of their own, relying
on non-Indians to come on to the reservation, operate businesses that provide jobs, and pay taxes
that fund the tribal government. 120 Other tribes focus on developing commercial operations of
their own to provide jobs and provide revenue (via profits) to the tribal treasury. 121 Some tribes
combine these two approaches. 122
Michael A. Pagano, “The Third Rail”: Local Governments and Taxing Espresso, 2003 ST. TAX TODAY 297-7,
Oct. 27, 2003 (indicating that local governments, “as creatures of their states, exercise fiscal authority differently
depending on what the state allows”).

114

115

See CANBY, supra note 110, at 71.
[A] tribe is quite unlike a city or other subdivision of a state. When a question arises as to the
power of a city to enact a particular regulation, there must be some showing that the state has
conferred such power on the city; the state, not the city, is the sovereign body from which power
must flow. A tribe, on the other hand, is its own source of power . . . the tribe is sovereign.

Id.
116
Blackstone, worried about papal interference in England, warned against such an “imperium in imperio [a
government within a government].” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *114.

As noted earlier, the federal government has exclusive power over the Indian tribes under the U.S. Constitution.
And federal law is supreme to state law when the federal government is acting within the authority delegated to it by
the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
117

118

For a history of federal Indian policy, see CANBY, supra note 110, at 12-34.

See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (where the Court noted the federal
government’s “‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development”) (emphasis
added); 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2018) (noting a congressional finding that “a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is
to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government”).
119

The Navajo Nation generally follows this model. The tribe collected approximately $109 million in taxes in fiscal
2018. OFF. OF THE NAVAJO TAX COMM’N, https://www.tax.navajo-nsn.gov/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
120

121
Since 1934, federal law has encouraged tribes to establish their own business operations. In that year, Congress
passed the Indian Reorganization Act (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79) which was designed to “permit Indian tribes
to equip themselves with the devices of modern business organization, through forming themselves into business
corporations.” S. REP. NO. 73-1080, at 1 (1934).
122

For example, a tribe could open a cannabis dispensary and collect both profits and taxes on sales to customers.

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at American Business Law Journal,
published by Wiley. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12174. The content of this document may vary from the final published version.

2020 / Taxing Cannabis

15

For those tribes that choose to start their own businesses, the most obvious example is the
operation of tribal casinos. 123 Tribes also run hotels, timber operations, restaurants,
manufacturing plants, industrial parks, smoke shops, professional sports franchises, gas
stations 124 and, of course, cannabis stores. 125
B.

Federal Taxation in Indian Country

1.

Federal Income Taxation

Tribes. Per IRS guidance since 1967, Indian tribes are not subject to the federal income tax on
any activities that they undertake directly 126 or through a federally-chartered Indian
corporation. 127 The exemption covers income from all tribal undertakings, regardless of whether
they are governmental or commercial in nature 128 and regardless of whether such activities are
conducted on or off the reservation. 129 The broad exemption from the federal income tax enjoyed
by Indian tribes is the product of long-standing, sometimes mysterious IRS policy rather than the
product of specific provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 130 While there are no definitive
rulings on point, the exemption granted to tribes does not appear to be required by the U.S.
Constitution. 131
The exemption for tribes is broad but is subject to exceptions. Importantly, the activities a
tribe conducts via a state-chartered corporation are subject to the federal income tax. 132 Less
importantly, the commercial (non-educational) income of tribal colleges and universities are
subject to the federal corporate income tax via the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), 133
which generally applies to the commercial income of charities and state colleges and
universities. 134
123

See infra Part IV.

E.g., Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What Challenges Lie Ahead for
Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 445 (2002)
(listing typical tribal business ventures); Margaret Graham Tebo, Betting on Their Future, ABA J. May 2006, at 33
(discussing the legal issues surrounding the Tulalip Tribe’s new shopping mall in Washington state). See generally
Sun, WOMEN’S NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, http://www.wnba.com/sun/ (website of the Women’s National
Basketball Association team the Connecticut Sun, acquired by the Mohegan tribe in 2003).
124

125

See supra Part I.B.

126

Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55.

127

Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15.

128

See id.

129

Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19.

While the Code does not directly address the income taxation of Indian tribes, I.R.C. § 7871 (2018) does treat
tribes as states for certain enumerated purposes. For example, taxes paid to Indian tribal governments are deductible
in the same manner as taxes paid to states under § 164.
130

131

For more detail, see Cowan, Leaving Money, supra note 108, at 383-88.

Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. The result is logical, as the activities of the tribe conducted via a state-chartered
corporation would fall squarely under the federal tax on the taxable income of corporations in I.R.C. § 11 (2018).
132

133

I.R.C. § 7871(a)(5) (2018).

134

I.R.C. § 511(a)(2) (2018).
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Exempting tribes from the federal income tax may at first glance appear unfair. But recall
that tribes are governments. And other sub-federal governments, like states, are generally not
subject to the federal income tax. 135
Tribal Members. With a few exceptions, 136 individual tribal members are subject to the
federal income tax like all other citizens of the United States. 137 Others (nonmembers of the
tribe) doing business on Indian reservations are generally subject to federal tax in the same
manner as when they operate elsewhere. 138
In recent years, issues have cropped up over whether certain tribal government payments
to tribal members are taxable. The IRS has long recognized a “general welfare exclusion” for
certain benefits received by individuals from the government (be it federal, state, local, or
tribal). 139 To qualify for this exclusion, the payment must be made under a government program,
be based on need, and not be compensation for services. 140 Tribal governments often pay
members for a greater variety of benefits than other governments. 141 Tribes may provide
assistance with housing, elder care, and education. 142 Tribes will also often help low-income
members purchase supplies for traditional ceremonies, feasts, and rituals. 143
When Native American advocacy groups noted that the IRS was claiming that many
tribal payments to members fell outside the general welfare exclusion, 144 Congress enacted the
Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014 (GWE). 145 Under the GWE, benefits members
receive from the tribal government are not taxable if they are administered under a program with
specified guidelines, promote general welfare, are available to all members who meet the
guidelines, are not lavish or extravagant, are not compensation for services, and do not

Income “accruing to the government of any possession of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof”
is not taxable. I.R.C. § 115 (2018). Since 1935, the IRS’s position has been that, even if Section 115 did not exist,
states would still not be taxed on any income they earn directly because they are beyond the scope of the federal
income tax as neither corporations nor individuals. Rather, the IRS views Section 115 as exempting income earned
by subdivisions of states where the income earned ultimately accrues to the state treasury. GEN. COUNS. MEM.
14,407, 1935-1 C.B. 103,107 (Jan. 28, 1935). Technically, the GCM was superseded by Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1
C.B. 28. Rev. Rul. 71-131, however, reached the same conclusion as the GCM, only without any legal analysis.
135

The exceptions are relatively narrow, dealing with income from “allotted lands” held in trust for the tribal
members by the federal government (see Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55) and income earned from fishing rights
granted by a treaty (see I.R.C. § 7873 (2018)).
136

137

Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 5 (1956).

Businesses operating on Indian reservations, however, may be eligible for (temporary but periodically-extended)
employment tax credits and accelerated depreciation. I.R.C. § 45A (2018) (Indian employment tax credit); I.R.C.
§ 168(j) (2018) (accelerated depreciation).
138

139

See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2014-35, 2014-26 I.R.B. 1110.

140

Id.

Kat Lucero, Tribes Await General Welfare Clarity, New Advisory Committee, 2015 TAX NOTES TODAY 232-3,
Dec. 3, 2015.
141

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

I.R.C. § 139E (2018).
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discriminate in favor of tribal leaders. 146 The GWE also provides that payments for participating
in cultural or ceremonial activities would not be considered compensation for services. 147
While the GWE solved one tax problem, it created another. Certain tribes and tribal
members interpreted the GWE as excluding distributions of gaming profits from taxation. 148
Congress had expressly made such distributions taxable in 1988. 149 Litigation ensued over
whether the GWE had made distributions of gaming profits exempt from tax. 150 The Eleventh
Circuit ruled that the GWE did not exempt distributions of gaming profits. 151
2.

Federal Excise Taxes

While the federal income tax rules are fairly clear, the federal excise tax picture in Indian
country is cloudy. The federal government imposes a variety of excise taxes. 152 The tax base
may be price or quantity. Taxes on products (like fuel, alcohol, or cigarettes) are generally
imposed on the manufacturer/producer when the product is removed from inventory to the next
stage in the supply chain. 153 Taxes on services (like wagering) are generally imposed on the
service provider (like a casino) at the time the service is rendered. 154 Unlike retail sales taxes,
excise taxes are usually built into the price of the product. 155
State governments are either explicitly exempt from many federal excise taxes by
statute 156 or tend not to engage in the taxed activities. 157 Tribes are explicitly exempt from many
of the same federal excise taxes as states. 158 But, unlike states, tribes are only exempt if the

146

Id.

147

I.R.C. § 139E(c)(5) (2018).

148

E.g., United States v. Jim, 891 F.3d 1242 (11th. Cir. 2018).

149

See infra Part IV.

150

United States v. Jim, 891 F.3d 1242 (11th. Cir. 2018).

151

Id. at 1251.

152

Federal excise taxes can be found in Subtitles D and E of the Internal Revenue Code.

E.g., I.R.C. §§ 4081-4105 (2018) (fuel taxes); I.R.C. §§ 5001-5872 (2018) (taxes on alcohol); I.R.C. §§ 57015763 (2018) (taxes on tobacco/cigarettes).
153

E.g., I.R.C. § 4401 (2018) (imposing a 0.25 percent excise tax on every wager to be paid by “each person who is
engaged in the business of accepting wagers”).
154

There are exceptions. The tax on air transportation, for example, is paid by the ticket purchaser/passenger and is
usually displayed on their receipt from the airline. See I.R.C. § 4261 (2018).
155

156
E.g., I.R.C. § 4253(i) (2018) (exempting state and local governments from the communications/phone excise
tax); I.R.C. § 4402(3) (2018) (exempting state-conducted lotteries and certain other gaming activity from the excise
tax on wagering).

For example, there appears to be no explicit exemption for state governments that engage in manufacturing
cigarettes, but there do not appear to be any state governments which do so.
157

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7871(a)(2) (2018) (treating tribes like states in determining exemptions from federal excise
taxes on special fuels, certain manufacturing activities, communications/phone, and the use of certain highway
vehicles). Tribes also have special exemptions in certain cases. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4225 (2018) (exempting “any
article of native Indian handicraft manufactured or produced by Indians on Indian reservations” from excise taxes on
manufacturers).

158
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transaction at issue “involves the exercise of an essential governmental function.” 159 Thus, the
federal excise tax exemption picture for tribes is a fuzzy one—which leads to misunderstandings
and litigation. It is not clear, for example, to what extent gaming (which provides funds to tribal
governments) is an essential governmental function (even though states do it too), 160 let alone
cannabis.
As further illustration of the uncertainty, consider the federal excise tax on wagering.
States are explicitly exempt from this tax, 161 while tribes are not. 162 Tribes, based on their
interpretation of laws on Indian gaming, have argued that they should be exempt from the
wagering tax. 163 The uncertainty resulted in litigation that culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court
ruling that tribes were not exempt from the tax. 164
C.

Sub-Federal Taxation in Indian Country

1.

Important Distinctions

In discussing tribal and state tax issues in Indian country, two important distinctions must be
understood. The first is the difference between tribal “members” and “nonmembers.” An
individual is a member of a tribe if he/she is listed on the membership roll of the tribe controlling
the reservation on which he/she resides or does business. All others, including non-Indians and
members of other Indian tribes, are considered nonmembers. 165
The second is the difference between the legal and economic incidence of a tax. The
“incidence” of a tax refers to the person or entity upon whom the tax falls. 166 The legal incidence
is usually clear: it is the party the tax statute specifies as being responsible for actually paying the
tax to the government. If the tax is not paid, the government will attempt to collect the tax from
the party with the legal incidence. In doing so, the government may impose penalties on that
party and, if necessary, seize that party’s assets to satisfy the tax bill. With the federal corporate
income tax, for example, the legal incidence is on the corporation itself. 167
The economic incidence falls on the person or entity that actually suffers economically
because of the tax. Corporations, for example, do not bear the economic incidence of the
corporate income tax. 168 They pass it along to customers (via charging higher prices for outputs),
suppliers (via paying lower prices for inputs), workers (via paying lower wages), or investors
159

I.R.C. § 7871(b) (2018).

160

See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at § 8.02[2][d].

161

I.R.C. § 4402(3) (2018).

162
See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(2) (2018) (not listing wagering taxes among those for which a tribe would be treated like a
state for exemption purposes).
163

See infra Part IV.

164

Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).

See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980) (noting
that members of tribes other than the tribe governing the reservation “stand on the same footing as non-Indians
resident on the reservation”).
165

166

RICHARD WESTIN, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 345 (2000).

167

See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2018).

168

DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 12-13 (2009).
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(via lowering their return or paying less in dividends). 169 Because the ability to transfer the
burden turns on market conditions, the law of supply and demand (including elasticity),
contractual arrangements, and other factors, economic incidence is difficult to measure.
Essentially the one who pays the tax may not be the one who suffers because of it.
2.

Tribal Taxation

As sovereign governments, tribes have the power to impose taxes on their members and on
nonmembers doing business within their jurisdiction. 170 Because of poor economic conditions on
many reservations, tribes often use transaction-based taxes, like severance taxes, sales taxes,
hotel occupancy taxes, and fuel taxes. 171 The hope is that the economic incidence of such taxes
will fall on nonmembers doing business in Indian country. 172
3.

State Taxation in Indian Country

Recall that the federal government has exclusive authority over Indian tribes. State power in
Indian country is, thus, rather limited. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that states are
prohibited from taxing tribes and tribal members directly with regard to their on-reservation
activities unless such taxation has been allowed by federal law. 173 States may, however,
generally tax tribal members and tribes on their off-reservation activities. 174 Absent federal

See id. at 70. After years of study, it is still difficult to pinpoint the bearer(s) of the corporate tax burden. See id.
at 57-71.

169

170
E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (holding a tribe may impose, based on its inherent
sovereign governmental powers, a severance tax on nonmember lessees extracting oil and gas from the reservation);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (upholding a tribal cigarette
tax on nonmembers purchasing cigarettes on the reservation).
171
The Navajo Nation, for example, has one of the most sophisticated tribal tax systems, imposing, among others, a
business activities tax, a per gallon fuel tax, a hotel occupancy tax, a sales tax, a severance tax, a liquor tax, a
tobacco tax, and a “junk food tax.” See generally OFF. OF THE NAVAJO TAX COMM’N, https://www.tax.navajonsn.gov/.
172

See id.

E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995) (striking down a state fuel excise tax
assessed on fuel sold by tribally owned stores and stating that a state tax will not stand if the legal incidence is
directly on the tribe or a tribal member operating entirely on the reservation); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 759 (1985) (striking down a state tax on royalties the Blackfeet tribe received from nonmember lessees of
oil and gas properties on the reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980) (striking down a state motor vehicle “privilege” tax assessed on tribal members); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (striking down a state personal property tax on a mobile home owned by a tribal
member because it was not explicitly authorized by federal law); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (striking down state cigarette and motor vehicle taxes where the
legal incidence of the tax fell on a tribal member); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 165
(1973) (ruling that Arizona may not impose its personal income tax on a tribal member working exclusively on the
reservation).
173

See, e.g. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-64 (1995) (upholding a state income tax on
tribal members who worked for an Indian tribe, but who lived off of the reservation); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (allowing the state of New Mexico to impose a gross receipts tax on a tribal ski resort
operated outside of the tribe’s reservation).
174
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preemption, a state is allowed to impose nondiscriminatory taxes on nonmembers doing business
on Indian reservations located within the state’s borders. 175
The ability of states to impose taxes in Indian country turns on the legal incidence of the
tax. If the legal incidence is on the tribe or tribal members, taxation is prohibited. 176 If the legal
incidence is on a nonmember, taxation is generally allowed—even if the economic incidence of
the tax is borne by the tribe or tribal members. Using legal incidence as the touchstone of
taxation is formalistic. Although a state cannot impose the legal incidence of a tax on tribes or
tribal members, it can effectively place the economic burden of the tax on the tribe or tribal
members. States can easily control the legal incidence of their taxes by the wording of their
statutes. States, for example, can place the legal incidence of a tax somewhere else in the supply
chain—on non-member customers or vendors of the tribe. 177 If these nonmembers can pass the
economic incidence of the tax on to the tribes or tribal members, then states are in effect taxing
tribes and tribal members by calibrating their tax statutes to place the legal incidence of a tax on
nonmembers. 178
It should now be evident that states and tribes often have the ability to tax the same
transactions involving nonmembers doing business in Indian country. For example, a state may
impose its sales tax (with a legal incidence on customers) on tribal sales to nonmembers in
Indian country at the same time the tribe imposes its own tax on those sales. This potential for
double taxation can create contentious disputes between tribes and states. 179

IV.

INDIAN GAMING

“You know, if they’d just left us alone, we would have had a 25-table card room. But no, they
had to push the issue, push the issue, and now there is Indian gaming all over the nation.” 180
175
E.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-59 (1980) (upholding
a state cigarette tax on nonmembers—even where the tribe imposed its own tax on such sales); Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (also upholding a state cigarette
tax on nonmembers purchasing cigarettes on the reservation because the legal incidence of the tax fell upon the
nonmember purchasers).
176

See supra note 173.

Mark J. Cowan, Anatomy of a State/Tribal Tax Dispute: Legal Formalism, Shifting Incidence, Potatoes, and the
Idaho Motor Fuel Tax, 8 J. LEGAL TAX RESEARCH 15 (2010) [hereinafter Cowan, Anatomy] (discussing how Idaho,
in the wake of a dispute with tribes in the state over fuel taxes, amended its statute in 2007 to move the legal
incidence of the fuel tax to a nonmember/non-tribal party in the fuel supply chain).
177

See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995) (noting that “if a State is unable to
enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to
amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence”).
178

See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-59 (1980)
(upholding a state cigarette tax on nonmembers—even where the tribe imposed its own tax on such sales); Cowan,
Anatomy, supra note 177 (discussing a contentious fuel tax dispute between Idaho and tribes within in the state—
where the state and each tribe wanted to impose a tax on fuel sold to nonmembers on Indian reservations). See also
infra Part V.C.1.

179

The Native American Casino Boom in the US, BBC NEWS WORLD SERVICE: WITNESS HISTORY (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3csyx0z [hereinafter BBC] (quoting Brenda Soulliere, former president of the
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians).

180
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In the 1980s, Indian gaming became a major source of state-tribal contention. With
gaming, tribes took the lead—seeking to offer a service that was not available in other parts of
the state. With cannabis, states took the lead, and certain tribes now want to join in offering the
service. How the states, tribes, and federal government addressed Indian gaming is instructive in
analyzing the tax landscape concerning cannabis sales on Indian reservations.
Indian gaming began in on a reservation in California in the early 1980s. The Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians opened a bingo parlor and a poker room, which attracted off-reservation
patrons—and the attention of the Riverside County Sheriff. 181 After its card room was raided by
the Sheriff’s Office, 182 the tribe went to court. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 183 the U.S. Supreme Court held that California could not prohibit or regulate gaming
occurring on Indian reservations. 184 While the federal government had granted some states—
including California—broad criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, 185 it had not granted the
states regulatory jurisdiction. 186 Because California did not prohibit all gaming activities (for
example, gambling was allowed at certain charitable events, and the state itself operated a
lottery), the Court determined California regulated gaming rather than prohibited it. 187 In
seeking to regulate gambling in Indian country, California was attempting to exercise its
civil/regulatory jurisdiction, and thus was exceeding its authority. 188
In response to Cabazon, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
(IGRA). 189 The IGRA gives states, tribes, and the federal government roles in regulating Indian
gaming, and it allows tribes to operate casino-type games that are far more lucrative than the
card room at issue in Cabazon. The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three classes. Class I
includes traditional or ceremonial tribal games. 190 Class II includes bingo and certain card
games. 191 All other games, including most casino games like blackjack, craps, and slot machines,
fall into Class III. 192
Class III games are the most lucrative and the ones the states most desire to prohibit or
regulate. Class III games are thus heavily regulated—requiring the state to agree to such games

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

480 U.S. 202 (1987).

184

Id. at 222.

In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 83-280 (commonly known as “Public Law 280”) which (as later amended)
granted six states, including California, substantial criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations with within their
borders (with some exceptions). See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2018).
185

186

See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207.

187

Id. at 211.

188

See id. at 222.

189

Codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2018).

190

25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2018).

191

25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (2018).

192

25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2018).
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via a tribal-state compact that is approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 193 The IGRA’s
compact process has facilitated the proliferation of tribal casinos, and Indian gaming is now an
industry with $30 billion in annual revenue. 194
The IGRA allows tribes to use profits from Class II and Class III games to fund
government operations or programs, the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members, the
promotion of economic development, donations to charity, or the operations of local government
agencies. 195 If a tribe adopts a plan to spend the profits on these activities, and the plan is
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, then the tribe may distribute any excess income to
members on a per-capita basis. 196
Recall that tribes do not pay taxes on businesses they operate directly or through a tribal
corporation. 197 Thus, if properly set up, tribes will not pay federal income tax on their casino
profits. But the IGRA makes clear that per-capita distributions of the profits to tribal members
are taxable to the recipients, 198 are subject to federal income tax withholding, 199 and the tribe is
required to notify its members that distributions are taxable. 200
If the casino is owned by the tribe and located on the reservation, its profits will not be
subject to state income tax, 201 and a state cannot condition its acceptance of a gaming compact
on the tribe agreeing to be subject to state tax. 202 A state can, however, negotiate for the tribe to
impose its tribal taxes on transactions that are comparable to state taxes on similar transactions
taking place off the reservation. 203 This result would ensure parity for on- and off-reservation
taxation of nonmembers.

V.

TAX POLICY PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

If the cannabis industry is to grow, it must exist in a fair and clear tax system. This Part identifies
current problems and recommends changes. Section A reviews the key tax policy principles
evoked by the taxation of cannabis in Indian country. Section B explains how current or
proposed laws could violate these principles at the federal level and offers prescriptions to

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2018). The IGRA requires states to negotiate gaming compacts with tribes in good faith.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (2018). Class III games, however, cannot be conducted on Indian reservations located in
states that prohibit all gaming for all purposes. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
193

194

BBC, supra note 180.

195

25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2018); 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2018).

196

25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3) (2018).

197

See supra Part III.B.

198

25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (2018).

199

I.R.C. § 3402(r) (2018).

200

25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (2018).

201

See supra Part III.C.

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(II) (2018) (directing courts to “consider any demand by the State for direct
taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as evidence that the State has not negotiated in good faith”).
202

203

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iv) (2018).
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remedy the violations. Section C mirrors this analysis at the sub-federal level. Section D provides
a brief summary.
A.

Key Tax Policy Principles

Two fundamental tax policy principles, dating to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, are
evoked by the taxation of cannabis on the reservation: horizontal equity and certainty.
1.

Horizontal Equity

“It is generally agreed that taxes should bear similarly upon all people in similar real
circumstances—especially those taxes, like the income tax whose central purpose is to
approximate that result . . . .” 204
“Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in equal
positions should be treated equally. This principle of equality, or horizontal equity, is
fundamental . . . .” 205
Taxpayers will not consider a tax “fair” unless it achieves horizontal equity. That is, the
tax should apply equally to taxpayers in similar situations. 206 With an income tax, for example,
those with the same income should pay the same tax.
Most experts agree that horizontal equity it is critical to a fair tax system. 207 For instance,
the need to restore horizontal equity to the tax system drove Congress to enact the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 208 and shut down tax shelters that were artificially reducing taxes. 209 Taxpayers had
been losing respect for the tax system, as it allowed them to rationalize cheating and buy their
own tax shelters. 210 When horizontal equity is absent, taxpayers will perceive a tax system as

204

HENRY C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 8 (1950).

205

RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959).

206
Joseph J. Cordes, Horizontal Equity, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 183-84 (Joseph J.
Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). Horizontal equity can be inferred from the concept of general equality/vertical
equity/ability to pay, as articulated by Adam Smith in his maxims on taxation. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 1043 (5th ed. Edwin Cannan Editor, 2003) (1776). The idea of horizontal equity is similar to the principle
applied in the justice system, that “[l]ike cases should be decided alike.” See BRYAN A. GARNER, ET AL., THE LAW
OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 21 (2016). Without it, respect for the law would erode.

Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113-23 (1990). But see Louis
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 139-55 (1989) (arguing that
horizontal equity is merely a subset of the ability to pay principle/vertical equity—the notion that those with more
income should pay more in taxes).
207

208

Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.

209

Cordes, supra note 206, at 184.

Long-time House Ways and Means Committee Chair Wilbur Mills called the tax system a “house of horrors”
because of special tax breaks and asked, “Can you believe that two more or less average American men could earn
the same amount of actual income, live side by side in identical houses on an identical standard of living—but that
one of them must pay five times as much federal income tax as the other?” Wilbur D. Mills, Are You a Pet or
Patsy?, LIFE, Nov. 23, 1959 at 51.

210
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unfair, be less likely to respect the tax system, and more likely to rationalize gaming the system.
An effective tax system cannot generate adequate revenues in such an environment. 211
Horizontal equity is not relevant when a tax is meant to limit externalities, such as excise
taxes on tobacco or cannabis. 212 It is thus acceptable to tax cannabis more heavily than other
products without violating horizontal equity. However, horizontal equity demands that cannabis
businesses be taxed the same.
2.

Certainty

“The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of
payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the
contributor, and to every other person . . . .” 213
Taxing statutes must be clear about who is taxed and in what amount. When uncertainty
extends to whether a tax applies at all, however, the consequences are graver. If there is
ambiguity over who is taxed and who is exempt, multiple statutes at play, or multiple bodies of
law (like Indian law, tax law, and constitutional law) at issue, taxpayers will claim exemptions,
and costly litigation would result. 214 A tax simply cannot be fair, effective, and raise adequate
revenue if clouded by uncertainty.
B.

Federal

1.

Current Federal Tax Policy Problems

Horizontal equity problems with current federal taxation of the cannabis business in Indian
country are clear. If a tribe owns a cannabis business, 215 Section 280E does not apply because the
Internal Revenue Code does not apply. Consider the following example, which applies Section
280E and denies deductions (other than cost of goods sold) to the privately-owned cannabis
retailer:

Gross Sales
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Margin
Rent

Non-Cannabis
Retailer
10,000,000
(7,000,000)
3,000,000
(300,000)

Privately-Owned
Cannabis Retailer
10,000,000
(7,000,000)
3,000,000
(300,000)

Tribal Cannabis
Retailer
10,000,000
(7,000,000)
3,000,000
(300,000)

211
Of course, “‘inequities’” are sometimes “more apparent than real.” Cordes, supra note 206, at 184. It is therefore
important to measure horizontal equity based on the often elusive economic incidence rather than the easier to
identify legal incidence. See supra Part III.C.1.
212

Cordes, supra note 206, at 184.

213

SMITH, supra note 206, at 1043-44.

See, e.g., the many examples of disputes over a relatively simple provision of the tax law, Section 280E, at supra
Part II.A.3.

214

215
If a tribal member owns a cannabis business, it will be taxed like any other cannabis business, and thus will not
result in a violation of horizontal equity.
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Utilities
Advertising
Salaries
“Actual” Income
Taxable Income
Tax at Corporate
Tax Rate of 21% 216
After-Tax Income
(“Actual” Income
less Tax)

25

(100,000)
(200,000)
(1,000,000)
1,400,000
1,400,000
294,000

(100,000)
(200,000)
(1,000,000)
1,400,000
3,000,000
630,000

(100,000)
(200,000)
(1,000,000)
1,400,000
0
0

1,106,000

770,000

1,400,000

The tax difference between the non-cannabis and the privately-owned cannabis retailers
could be justified by the externalities that can result from cannabis use. 217 The real horizontal
equity problem is between privately-owned cannabis businesses and tribally-owned cannabis
businesses. Here, tribes enjoy a significant tax preference that gives them an unfair competitive
advantage in the cannabis industry. Tribal cannabis operations also enjoy another advantage:
they do not have to bifurcate their operations between cannabis and non-cannabis to partially
escape Section 280E. In contrast, non-tribal cannabis dispensaries have expended considerable,
often futile, effort to show they are operating some non-cannabis businesses. 218
2.

Potential Federal Tax Policy Developments

In addition to addressing existing federal tax policy concerns, we must look to possible federal
legalization of cannabis. Congress could take a variety of approaches, 219 but two recent
proposals are instructive: the Marijuana Revenue and Regulation Act (MRRA) 220 and the
Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019 (MORE). 221 In general,
each bill would legalize cannabis at the federal level and create a federal regulatory regime. Each
bill would also remove cannabis from the CSA’s schedules, 222 which would render Section 280E
ineffective for cannabis businesses. 223
216

The rate can vary depending on how the business is structured. See supra Part II.A.4.

See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Section 280E’s legislative history states that Congress intended to
treat traffickers in controlled substances more harshly than other businesses. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
217

218

See supra Part II.A.3.

See, e.g. JANE G. GRAVELLE & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43785, FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO TAX
MARIJUANA: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2014) (discussing various ways of taxing cannabis—including by price,
weight, or potency).
219

220

S. 420, 116th Cong. (2019) (introduced by Sen. Wyden, perhaps being a bit too on the nose with the numbering).

H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2019). The bill would also amend all of federal law to replace the term “marihuana” or
“marijuana” with “cannabis.” Id. at § 10. Another legalization bill, the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment
Through Entrusting States Act (STATES Act) contains no tax provisions. S. 1028,116th Cong. (2019).
221

222

S. 420, 116th Cong. § 201 (2019); H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).

See I.R.C. § 280E (2018) (disallowing deductions only for business trafficking in Schedule I and Schedule II
controlled substances).
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Although cannabis businesses would be relieved of Section 280E, they would also be
subject to a new price-based federal excise tax on cannabis. 224 The tax would be the liability of
the cannabis “manufacturer,” defined as any person who plants, cultivates, harvests, produces,
manufactures, compounds, processes, prepares, or packages a cannabis product, and would be
due at removal from inventory. 225 Removal occurs when the product is moved or sold to the next
link in the supply chain—traditionally the wholesaler. For vertically integrated “seed to sale”
operators, a “constructive price” would be calculated. 226 MRRA would create a new excise tax
for cannabis at an initial rate of 10%, which would rise over five years to 25%. 227 It does not
appear to exempt medical cannabis. MORE would consolidate the tax on cannabis with the
existing tax on tobacco and impose a tax of 5%, 228 which would not apply to medical
cannabis. 229
3.

Federal Tax Policy Prescriptions

Federal Income Tax. Tribes currently enjoy a tremendous federal income tax advantage over
non-tribal cannabis businesses. This horizontal equity problem would be reduced if Congress deschedules cannabis, thus removing Section 280E from the legal cannabis industry. Even if
Congress neutralizes Section 280E, a horizontal equity problem would remain, because tribes
still do not pay federal income tax.
To achieve horizontal equity, should tribes be taxed on their cannabis profits? The answer
depends on how we view tribes. Tribes are governments that frequently operate businesses. If
you view the tribe as a government, its cannabis profits should not be taxed. State governments
do not pay federal income taxes, even when earning commercial income via gaming (lotteries),
convention centers, or liquor stores. Tribes, as governments, should not either. If you view the
tribe as a business, 230 however, it should be taxed on its business profits. Private cannabis
businesses pay federal income tax. Thus, tribal cannabis stores should as well.
Because of a tribe’s multiple roles, horizontal equity problems are not completely
soluble, but the example set by the IGRA could help. 231 The IGRA did not attempt to tax tribes
on their casino income; it let tribes develop a plan to spend their profits on government expenses
and then distribute any excess profits to tribal members on a per-capita basis. The IGRA
expressly made these per-capita payments taxable. In doing so, it effectively struck a balance
See, e.g., Carl Davis, Cannabis Legalization: Tax Cut or Tax Hike?, 165 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 449, 455 (Oct. 21,
2019) (concluding that Section 280E’s disallowance of deductions to cannabis businesses “might have an impact
roughly equivalent to a 6.25 percent tax on the sales price of cannabis”).
224

225

S. 420, 116th Cong. § 101 (Sec. 5902(9)) (2019); H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. § 4(b) (2019).

The constructive price subject to tax would be the lower of the price the cannabis is sold at retail or the highest
price for which manufacturers ordinarily sell the product to wholesalers, as determined by the government. See
I.R.C. § 4216(b) (2018) (MORE, referencing the existing constructive price rules in the tobacco rules); S. 420, 116th
Cong. § 101 (Sec. 5903(c)(2)) (2019) (MRRA).
226

227

S. 420, 116th Cong. § 101 (Sec. 5901(b)) (2019).

228

H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. § 4(b) (2019).

229

Id.

I am not suggesting tribes are businesses; they are governments. But, like states, tribes own and operate
businesses, and thus we must view tribes as businesses for purposes of determining the appropriate tax treatment.
230

231

See supra Part IV.

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at American Business Law Journal,
published by Wiley. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12174. The content of this document may vary from the final published version.

2020 / Taxing Cannabis

27

between the tribe as a government (where profits are not taxable if used for government
operations or benefits) and the tribe as a business owner (where profits not used for government
operations or benefits are taxed at the member level). The IGRA thus respected the tribe’s dual
role.
Congress, as part of its cannabis reform efforts, should consider an IGRA-type of law for
cannabis sales in Indian country. It could be called the Indian Cannabis Regulatory Act (ICRA).
Under this hypothetical ICRA, a tribe entering the cannabis business would need to develop a
plan to use the cannabis profits for government operations or for payments to tribal members that
would qualify under the GWE. Excess profits could be distributed on a per-capita basis to
members, and would expressly be subject to taxation and withholding. If the cannabis business
thrives, only profits not spent on governmental operations would be taxed. If the cannabis
business does not thrive, then none of its income would be taxed because there would not be any
excess profits to distribute to tribal members. An ICRA would be the federal government’s best
shot at maintaining horizontal equity over cannabis sales in Indian country—without disturbing
the tribes’ long-standing exemption from federal income taxation.
In enacting an ICRA, Congress should also be concerned with the tax policy issue of
certainty. Because an ICRA would be layered on top of the IGRA and the GWE, it must be clear
about which tribal government payments to members would be exempt under the GWE and
which tribal government payments to members would be taxable under the IGRA or ICRA. As
noted earlier, lack of certainty in this easily-clarified area has led to litigation. 232
Excise Taxes. It is not clear whether the proposed federal excise tax on cannabis would
apply to cannabis sales by Indian tribes. As noted earlier, tribes are subject to some excise taxes
but are exempt from others. 233 In the interest of certainty, whether the tribes are subject to or
exempt from the federal cannabis excise tax should be made explicit. Leaving the position
ambiguous for tribes would only lead to litigation. 234
Beyond the issue of certainty is, once again, the issue of horizontal equity. Some have
suggested that tribes should be exempt from any federal excise tax on cannabis, perhaps as long
as 50 years, to allow tribes to develop the industry. 235 Such a tax holiday would create serious
horizontal equity problems. If Congress wants to exempt tribes from federal cannabis taxes to
encourage economic development, it should state so clearly and be willing to live with the
market distortions that result.
The decision whether to tax the tribes should turn on the expected structure of the
industry upon federal legalization. If the cannabis industry continues to be operated by private
enterprises, tribes should be subject to the excise tax to ensure horizontal equity. If federal
legalization fosters state-run cannabis businesses, then either the states and tribes should both be
subject to the tax or neither should be. A tax exemption would provide a substantial and visible
tax advantage to tribal or perhaps state cannabis stores. This result raises the issue of tax
salience, 236 “the extent to which taxpayers account for the costs imposed by taxation when the
232

See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.

233

See supra Part III.B.2.

234

See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.

235

Smith, supra note 29, at 549-50.

236
There is a vast literature on salience in taxation. For discussion of the leading works, see David Gamage &
Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011).
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taxpayers make decisions or judgments.” 237 Because they are imposed at the producer rather than
retail level, excise taxes generally are hidden in the price and do not have as much salience as
sales taxes. 238
While excise taxes in general are low in salience, cannabis taxes might not be. If cannabis
is not subject to federal excise tax on the reservation but is subject to it off reservation, customers
will notice. Tribes could charge a lower price and distort the market, and, if the federal
government imposes an MRRA-like tax at 25%, the difference will be quite salient. 239
Unlike with the federal income tax, tribes have historically not enjoyed a blanket
exemption from federal excise taxes. That fact, and the horizontal issues at stake, favor
subjecting tribes to any new federal cannabis excise tax (assuming states are treated the same
way).
C.

States and Tribes
1.

Sub-Federal Tax Policy Problems

It is hard to apply horizontal equity principles at the sub-federal level because there are multiple
governments involved and no coordination mechanism among them. 240 More general issues of
fairness arise when a product is taxed differently on versus off the reservation. The unique subfederal tax landscape that applies in Indian country 241 can create both unfair advantages and
disadvantages for tribes.
First, looking at the unfair advantages, recall that states’ ability to impose taxes on Indian
reservations turns on the legal incidence of the tax. Although legal incidence is easier to
determine than economic incidence, the legal incidence is not always clear. 242 If the state
(perhaps inadvertently) places the legal incidence on a tribe or tribal member, the tax will be
ineffective, and it would allow the tribe to capture the revenue from the tax by either imposing its
own tax or marketing a tax exemption to nonmembers. For example, on-reservation cannabis
stores might sell products at a lower price than nearby off-reservation stores because of the tax
advantage.
Sometimes, a state tax validly applies on the reservation, but the state is limited in its
ability to enforce collection. This dynamic arose in many states with cigarette taxes. Tribes and
tribal members would use their exemption from state taxes to improperly sell cigarettes to

237

Id. at 23.

238

See id. at 23, n. 11 (quoting economist Milton Friedman for this proposition with respect to the value added tax).

See Oglesby, Look Out, supra note 92, at 543 (noting that people will travel outside of their city of residence to
get lower-taxed cannabis in nearby cities).
239

For an exploration of these vexing issues, see MUSGRAVE, supra note 205, at 179-83 (discussing how,
theoretically, horizontal equity might be achieved on the total tax bill across multiple taxing jurisdictions).
240

241

See supra Part III.C.

242
See generally Cowan, Anatomy, supra note 177, at 1 (discussing cases where a court disagreed with a state over
whether the legal incidence of a state tax fell on a tribe or tribal member).
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nonmembers free of state tax locally or over the Internet. 243 Tribal-state disputes over cigarette
taxes have even become tumultuous. 244
So far, there is no indication that tribes are entering the cannabis business to market a tax
exemption. Rather, they are entering the industry to run cannabis businesses (often seed to sale)
for the profit potential. 245 But the situation could change unless tribes, states, and the federal
government work together to ensure a fair tax structure.
Let’s look at the unfair disadvantages at the sub-federal level for tribes. As noted earlier,
states and tribes often have the ability to tax the same transactions. A tribe may impose a sales
tax, for example, on on-reservation sales. A state may impose its own sales tax on on-reservation
sales, provided the legal incidence is placed on the nonmember customer and not the tribal
retailer. This overlapping state/tribal taxing jurisdiction may result in double taxation. The
possibility of double taxation can have a chilling effect on nonmember investment in Indian
country that stifles economic development. For example, a nonmember company extracting oil
on an Indian reservation may be subject to both state and tribal severance taxes. 246 If that same
company had been operating outside of Indian country, only the state tax would apply. All else
being equal, the nonmember company would most likely choose to operate on non-Indian land
before exploiting the resources within Indian country. One economic analysis noted, for
example, that a double severance tax would reduce on-reservation production, leading not only
to a reduction in tax revenue, but a reduction in royalties paid to the tribe and a reduction in onreservation employment opportunities. 247
The potential economic impact of a double tax on cannabis has not been explored. A
double tax, however, would obviously put on-reservation cannabis stores at a competitive
disadvantage compared to nearby off-reservation cannabis stores. Furthermore, the specter of
double taxation would discourage both tribes and nonmembers from opening cannabis stores on
Indian reservations. 248 For the cannabis industry to function in Indian country, this specter must
be removed. Fortunately, there are no indications that states and tribes are battling over cannabis
taxes or are imposing simultaneous taxes, but that could change as the industry spreads and the
tax revenue at stake rises.
See, e.g,. Red Earth LLC v. United States, 657 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (reviewing constitutional challenges to
the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009). Cigarette taxation involves different issues from cannabis and
federal legislation in this area complicates things.
243

See Dean Schabner, Indians Cigarette Tax Fight Smolders, ABC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2006)
https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=96774&page=1. Further discussion of implementation/enforcement/collection
issues is beyond the scope of this article. If the governments involved work together to create a fair and clear
multijurisdictional tax system to govern cannabis sales, there will be less likelihood of contentious, cigarette-tax-like
disputes over compliance.
244
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See supra Part I.B.

See e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (upholding both state and tribal severance
taxes on the production of oil and gas on reservation land by nonmembers).

246

247
Robert William Alexander, The Collision of Tribal Natural Resource Development and State Taxation: An
Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 387, 416 (1997).

But see Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX
LAW. 897, 1220 (2010) (questioning “whether double taxation should be viewed as even existing when a tribe is
simultaneously the taxing sovereign and the vendor of the taxed good” because in that case the label “tax” is just a
formality with “no independent economic significance”).
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One could argue about which government (state or tribal) is at fault for the presence of
double taxation. In reality, both tribes and states need to finance their operations and both
provide services (such as roads, schools, a court system) that benefit nonmembers operating in
Indian country. Accordingly, in most cases, both the tribe and the state have valid claims to tax
revenue from activity taking place on Indian reservations. Implicitly acknowledging this reality,
the Supreme Court has largely refused to prioritize one government’s assertion of tax jurisdiction
over the other’s; often allowing both the state tax and tribal tax to stand. The absence of a
jurisprudential resolution to the competing (and often meritorious) tribal and state claims to
taxation stokes historic enmity between tribes and states and can lead to rather contentious tax
disputes. There have been drawn-out, acrimonious disputes, for example, over whether the tribe
or the state has priority to impose fuel taxes. 249
2.

Sub-Federal Tax Policy Prescriptions

The cannabis industry in Indian country is still at an early stage. Knowing the cost of prior tax
disputes, it would behoove states and tribes to avoid repeating the same tax battles they have
fought in the past. Absent a revision in the Supreme Court’s views on state/tribal tax matters,
there are two primary ways that state/tribal tax conflicts could effectively be resolved:
congressional intervention or the use of state/tribal compacts. Congress could use its plenary
power over the tribes and its power over state taxes that implicate interstate commerce to
develop a scheme that reconciles tribal and state claims to taxation of nonmembers in Indian
country. However, even if Congress wished to deal with this issue, it is unlikely that Congress
would be able to develop one set of rules that would fairly reconcile competing state and tribal
claims to tax revenue in every case. Each state/tribe relationship is unique—with the state
providing some services and the tribe providing others. In addition, cannabis taxes and
regulations vary greatly by state. Given the diversity of state/tribal relations, a national “one size
fits all” rule is unlikely to yield satisfactory results in all cases.
As an alternative to Congressional action, states and tribes can try to put aside their
differences and negotiate tax compacts to avoid double taxation, provide certainty, and allocate
tax revenue between the two governments. To wit, over 200 state/tribal tax compacts are in
existence. 250 The provisions of tax compacts can vary greatly. 251 Often, however, the tribe will
agree to collect a tax on the reservation that equals the state tax charged off the reservation. This
agreement prevents the reservation from becoming a tax haven and also eliminates the specter of
double taxation. The state and the tribe then agree how they will divide the revenue collected via
the on-reservation tax. Idaho, for example, resolved a multi-year dispute with several tribes over
fuel taxes via a negotiated compact. 252
Compacts are advantageous to both parties and to the business community because the
compacts provide certainty in an otherwise confusing area of the law. With a compact, the state
and the tribe are assured of a predictable revenue stream, and the business community is assured
that it will not be treated more harshly on the reservation than off it.
249

See Cowan, Anatomy, supra note 177 (discussing a contentious state-tribal tax dispute over fuel taxes in Idaho).
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COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at § 8.05.
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For some examples, see id.at § 8.05.
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See Cowan, Anatomy, supra note177.
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It can be difficult, however, to get states and tribes to put aside their differences, but the
IGRA can provide a framework. The IGRA required the tribes and states to negotiate a compact
before a tribe could operate Class III gaming on its reservation. 253 A similar compact could be
required for cannabis under an ICRA. 254 A model compact might be provided, which would
address regulatory and tax issues. This approach would allow the federal government to assist in
reconciling tribal-state interests while not imposing a one-size fits all rule.
Even if no ICRA is forthcoming, states and tribes can resolve any local problems among
themselves. In fact, there are models already in place. Washington was the pioneering state,
passing legislation empowering its governor to negotiate cannabis contracts with Indian tribes
located in the state and setting standard terms for such compacts. 255 In 2015, Washington
entered into the nation’s first compact state-tribal cannabis compact—with the Squamish
Tribe. 256 Under the compact, sales of cannabis on the reservation are not subject to state
taxation, 257 but the tribe must impose a tax equal to at least 100% of the state tax on sales of
cannabis on the reservation. 258 Exceptions are provided 1) for sales of cannabis to the tribe, its
affiliates, members of the tribe or their businesses, 2) if the product was grown, produced, or
processed on the reservation, 3) for transactions otherwise exempt under federal or state law, and
4) for sales of medical cannabis. 259 The tribe may tax such sales if it so chooses. 260 If the state
requests, the tribe must hire an auditor to verify compliance. 261 Any tax proceeds must be used
by the tribe for essential government services. 262
Following Washington’s example, Nevada passed legislation in 2017 enabling the
governor to enter into cannabis compacts with Indian tribes. 263 Nevada now has compacts in

253

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2018).

Tribes and states might want to support an ICRA for non-tax reasons as well. Some tribes may want to legalize
cannabis but the states within which they are located do not. Or some states may want to legalize but a tribe in the
state does not. An ICRA framework would help resolve these issues, as the IGRA did for gaming.
254

255

WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.490 (2019).

Marijuana Compact Between the Squamish Tribe and the State of Washington (Sept. 15, 2015),
https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/Compact-9-14-15.pdf [hereinafter Squamish Compact]. Washington and
other tribes have subsequently entered into similar compacts. E.g., Marijuana Compact Between the State of
Washington and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians (2015),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2699297/Puyallup-Tribal-Compact.pdf.
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Squamish Compact, supra note 256, at § V.F.1.

258

Id. at § V.F.2.
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Id.

260

Id.
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Id. at § V.F.2.b.

262
Id. at § V.F.2.a. Essential government services include, for example, “administration, public facilities, fire,
police, health, education, elder care, social services, sewer, water, environmental and land use, transportation, utility
services, community development, and economic development.” Id. at § IV.D.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 223.250 (2019). The legislative history of this statute reports that Nevada wanted to enact a
similar system to Washington’s “successful system for cooperation with the tribal governments in its state.” 2017
Statutes of Nevada, Ch. 305, SB 375, at 1617.
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place with several tribes located in the state. 264 Although the tax provisions of the Nevada
compacts mostly mirror the Washington ones, there is one important difference. Nevada, unlike
Washington, did not agree to exempt reservation-grown cannabis from the requirement that the
tribe tax cannabis at a rate of at least 100% of the state tax rate. 265 This difference is further
evidence that a national approach to tax issues in Indian country is not advisable. Local
differences and preferences should be accommodated.
Compacts are not perfect. Both the state and the tribe must cede some sovereignty when
entering into a compact. In particular, tribes give up some control over how cannabis will be
taxed. In Washington and Nevada, the tribes agreed to impose (at least) the same taxes as the
state. Thus, the tribes must follow the lead of the state as it tweaks its tax system. As tax issues in
the nascent cannabis industry must be properly calibrated, 266 what is ideal for the state as a
whole may not work well in Indian country. Perhaps that result is a small price to pay to ensure
fairness and certainty.
D.

Summary

At the federal level, tribes are quietly benefiting from their tax-exempt status, which includes
their exemption from Section 280E. This benefit yields an unfair advantage to be sure, but one
that tribes did not choose. Section 280E is the product of Congress, and only Congress can fix
the resulting inequities. If tribes wish to be active in the cannabis industry, they should want the
industry as a whole to succeed, and that success is more likely to happen if the industry operates
in a federal tax system that strives for horizontal equity. From a business strategy standpoint,
therefore, tribes should not resist an ICRA-type law that imposes an income tax on per-capita
distributions to tribal members. Nor should tribes try to get a special exemption from any
forthcoming federal excise tax on cannabis. If tribes want to be part of the industry, they should
be treated the same as other cannabis businesses.
At the sub-federal level, it appears that tribes and states have been focusing on turning
cannabis into a viable industry, not on exploiting tax advantages provided by a complex, often
unfair system. So far, a spirit of cooperation seems to be the norm, but the temptation to exploit
long-standing inequities in the tax system is not far away. Tribes and states should resist this
temptation and keep the focus where it belongs—on providing a safe and sustainable cannabis
industry.
Tribes must partner with their adjacent states to ensure an even playing field for taxes
both on and off the reservation. This partnership will allow the tribe to compete and raise
revenue without any special tax advantage or disadvantage. That result will be good for the
industry as a whole, but it only solves part of the problem. The federal government, the only
sovereign with the power to remove the Section 280E problem and create a national framework
for both states and tribes, must act. When it does, perhaps via an ICRA, it must keep the
important tax policy goals of horizontal equity and certainty clearly in focus. In the meantime,
E.g., Marijuana Compact Between the Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians and the State of Nevada (July 18, 2017),
http://marijuana.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/marijuananvgov/Content/Stay_Informed/Ely-Shoshone-Compact-FullyExecuted.pdf [hereinafter Paiute Compact]. A full list of Nevada’s cannabis compacts with tribes is available at Stay
Informed, MARIJUANA IN NEVADA, http://marijuana.nv.gov/Stay_Informed/Resources/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
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See Paiute Compact, supra note 264, at § V.E.2. (not listing an exemption for reservation-grown cannabis).
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See supra Part II.B.
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tribes and states must continue to resolve matters locally. In doing so, they would be welladvised to look to the state-tribal compacts in Nevada and Washington as examples.

CONCLUSION
The current law surrounding the cannabis industry is uncertain. Tax is just one part of this
complicated puzzle. Until the federal government acts, the states, the tribes, and the industry
must bear the burden of these complexities with as much grace as possible. Since we are at an
early stage, now is an opportune time for the three sovereigns to coordinate their efforts and level
the tax playing field between on and off reservation sellers. States or tribes should not try to
exploit an often ambiguous, unfair, and multi-sovereign tax structure to their advantage. Instead,
they should work with their fellow sovereigns to develop a fair and certain tax framework that
will allow the cannabis industry to grow. The best strategy for the cannabis industry, including
the tribal cannabis industry, is to support these efforts. It is the industry’s stability and growth,
fostered by a clear and fair tax system, which—through increased economic development and
additional tax revenue—will benefit all the governments involved over the long term. Tax
disparities—like cannabis itself—might temporarily alleviate some symptoms, but they won’t
cure the underlying ailments.

